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Abstract
Since the early 2000s, many Indian states started reforming their agricultural marketing policies
and allowed private traders to buy directly from farmers outside the state-regulated market
system. The experience of these states during the period 2000 - 2012 can shed light on the impact
of market-oriented reforms and the role of public procurement. Using individual-level National
Sample Survey Data on agricultural wages and a new dataset on state-level average real farm
income per cultivator for 18 major Indian states between 1987 – 2012, this paper
shows, using both a difference-in-difference and a triple difference framework, that marketing
reforms alone did not contribute to higher farm incomes and agricultural wages. However, when
these reforms were coupled with public procurement at the minimum support price, farm
incomes and agricultural wages significantly improved. The effects of public procurement were
driven primarily by rice procurement. Our results suggest that market-reforms and public
procurement at minimum support prices were complements which together contributed to
raising rural incomes in states like Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh.
Keywords: farm incomes, agricultural wages, market-oriented reforms, public procurement, India
JEL Codes: O13; Q13; Q18
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1.

Introduction

In 2021, India’s farmers protested against three new farm laws which aimed to reform the agricultural
marketing system by reducing the role of licensed middlemen and public procurement at minimum
support prices. The peaceful year long struggle by farmers outside the national capital forced the BJP
government in New Delhi to repeal the proposed reforms which were legislated in September 2020. While
the farmer movement succeeded in reinstating status quo ante, the question of whether reforms would
have benefitted a wider range of farmers remains somewhat unanswered.
Since early 2000s, several Indian states started liberalizing their agricultural marketing systems (mandis)
and allowed for greater direct purchases by private traders and large corporations. The experience of
these states during the period 2000 - 2012 can shed light on the impact of market-oriented reforms and
the role of public procurement. By comparing changes between reform states and non-reform states, this
paper shows that market-oriented reforms alone have not had any causal impact on farm incomes and
agricultural wages. However, when these reforms are coupled with public procurement at a minimum
support price, farm incomes and agricultural wages significantly improved. The experience of states
between 2000 – 2012 demonstrates that agricultural reforms and public procurements are complements
which together contributed to raising rural incomes in states like Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, and Andhra
Pradesh.
As the farmer movement dominated the academic and public discourse, the role of the state in restricting
market competition or providing a safety-net to attenuate rural distress was fiercely debated. On the one
hand, proponents of reforms argued that the traditional agricultural marketing system restricted the
ability of the private sector to buy directly from farmers. These policies hindered competition and kept
agricultural incomes depressed by limiting the buyers available to farmers. Further, policies like the
minimum support price (MSP) were regressive as they primarily benefitted rich farmers in a few northern
states of Punjab and Haryana while subsistence farmers were excluded from this income safety-net.
Therefore, opening up agricultural markets to greater competition would raise crop prices and address
the allocational inefficiencies in the system, argued supporters of reforms.
On the other hand, farmer organizations believed that reforms would dismantle the regulated market
sites known as mandis that had been established under the Agricultural Produce Markets Commission of
1930. They argued that contrary to popular belief, the existing system incentivized greater competition
and price discovery. Under the old (and now reinstated) system, the arhatiyas or the broker would
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mediate sales between farmers and buyers. The buyers could be the government, private traders,
exporter, or domestic processors. Since the arhatiya’s brokerage was a fixed percentage of total revenue,
it would be in their interest to ensure that farmers would get the highest possible price.1 As the MSP is
fixed by the federal government and cannot be negotiated, the arhatiyas maximized their returns by
ensuring that the maximum possible quantity of grain was sold to the government. In addition, these
commission agents also provide timely cash payments to farmers and help them with intertemporal loans.
Farmer organizations believed that the reforms would actually stifle competition by forcing farmers to
individually negotiate with large corporate buyers.
Further, the reforms would also render the promise of the minimum support price by the government
redundant as opening up direct sales between farmers and private traders would be accompanied by a
reduction in the actual procurement by the state. This would increase farmers’ reliance on the buyers who
can depress prices by exploiting the monopsonies in agricultural commodity markets.
Following the farmer’s protests last year, the political and academic discourse around farm laws has
focused primarily on issues of procurement, MSP, and the ability of private traders and large corporations
to buy crops directly from farmers. However, reforming the agricultural sector consists of a broad range
of policy recommendations including contract farming, rationalization of farm taxes and subsidies, direct
sale to private sector firms outside the mandis, excluding fruits and vegetables from the purview of the
mandis and allowing e-trading of agricultural goods (Chand & Singh, 2016). Most of these reforms were
outlined in the model APMC Act of 2003. Since agriculture is a state subject, the implementation of this
Act was left to the Indian states which selectively enacted provisions of this Act in the subsequent decade.2
The Model APMC Act of 2003 provided a broad framework for states to adopt far reaching reforms aimed
at increasing market access. The rationale behind these policy suggestions was that an increase in the
number of potential buyers would generate greater competition and raise prices for the farmers (Ghosh,
2013). Further, this would also reduce the reliance of farmers on the MSP and allow them to diversify
away from food crops like wheat and rice.
While farmers have objected to several provisions of these reforms, their primary opposition has been
towards two proposed changes. First, farmers have opposed the deregulation of the mandis and the
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The commission rates vary significantly across states. For instance, arhatiyas in Punjab and Haryana charge around
2.5 percent commission but those in Andhra Pradesh charge around 1 percent (Chaba and Damodaran, 2020).
2
The next section provides an overview of the progress in reforms across the states. For a full history of APMC
Reforms see (Purohit et al., 2017; Chand, 2016).
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delicensing of commission agents (arhatiyas) in the regulated markets. Second, farmers have demanded
a retention of the MSP and guarantees of procurement by the state. These provisions of the earlier farm
laws were dismantled by the new farm laws legislated in September 2020. While the government assured
farmers that the de jure provisions of the three new farm laws would not impact government procurement
and MSP, farmers argued that the laws would de facto eliminate the MSP by reducing government
procurement.
Several commentators have argued for decades that sectors of the Indian economy like the manufacturing
sector, which were not sufficiently liberalized, have performed worse than the services sector, which were
deregulated in the 1990s. In the context of agriculture, the existing regulatory framework of controlling
prices led to created food shortages and distorted incentives (Mehta, 2013). Chand and Singh (2016) argue
that lack of reforms in the agricultural sector contributed to low and cyclical growth rates and greater
concentration of poverty in this sector in comparison with the reformed non-agricultural sector.
However, the arguments supporting the liberalization of agricultural markets has failed to account for
certain structural features of Indian agriculture. For instance, market prices are highly correlated with
actual procurement of food grains by FCI. In places where the government actually buys wheat and rice
from the farmers, it creates a price floor for private buyers. This increases competition and farm incomes,
rather than decreasing it. Second, agricultural prices vary significantly between farmers. Most small and
marginal farms in India lack access to storage facilities and are forced to sell their produce at low prices
(farm gate prices) after harvest, when supply is at its peak. Finally, stagnant agricultural productivity, low
levels of public capital formation and credit constraints adversely impact incomes of over 55 million small
and marginal farmers in India (Gulati and Bathla, 2001; Krishnamurthy, 2012; Chatterjee, 2017; Chatterjee
et al., 2020; Gulati, Kapur and Bouton, 2020).
In addition to these well documented imperfections in agricultural market, the debate on the role of
marketing reforms has paradoxically, overlooked the experience of states that already adopted a marketfriendly marketing system between 2004 and 2012. For example, the state of Madhya Pradesh, has been
a frontrunner in enacting agricultural reforms allowing large private corporations like ITC to buy directly
from farmers by circumventing the mandi system completely. Madhya Pradesh has also witnessed some
of the highest growth rates in agricultural productivity between 2005 - 2012 (Gulati, Rajkhowa and
Sharma, 2017). However, this state has also witnessed many farmer agitations and protests during the
same period. Further, both central and state governments have provided farmers with monetary
4

incentives to raise production and have consistently increased public procurement to address farmers’
discontent and agrarian distress in the state. Therefore, in Madhya Pradesh, reforms and public
procurement seems to have been used as complementary tools.
Like Madhya Pradesh, several states selectively adopted the recommendations of the Model APMC Act
during 20004 – 2012 and in the process, developed various models of agricultural marketing. For instance,
Bihar completely abolished the AMPC mandi system and farmers relied (almost) exclusively on private
markets to sell their crops. Similarly, in states like Maharashtra, Gujarat and Karnataka, the primacy of
APMC mandis as the primary site of exchange between farmers and traders was significantly reduced.
Other states like Assam and Rajasthan developed hybrid marketing system where unregulated market
systems were created outside the APMC mandis. Finally, other states like West Bengal, Punjab and Uttar
Pradesh did not change their agricultural marketing system and continued to rely on the APMC mandis
for the sale of agricultural commodities.
As states were changing their agricultural marketing laws to allow for greater participation by private
corporations, the role of public procurement at the minimum support price (MSP) also evolved. Some
states like Punjab, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh relied almost exclusively on price support provided to
farmers by food grain procurement and eschewed reforms, while others like Andhra Pradesh, Haryana
and Madhya Pradesh augmented market reforms with a robust public procurement of wheat and rice.
One of the main reasons for the absence of evidence driven discourse in the debate around the
performance of states that enacted various market-friendly reforms was the absence of consistent time
series data on state-level farm incomes. Chand, Saxena and Rana (2015) suggest that by subtracting the
total wage bill in agriculture from the net value added, we can construct estimates of farm income per
cultivator. Basu and Misra (2022) use this formulation to construct the first state-level estimates of farm
incomes from 1987-88 to 2011-12. This time series data shows that states like Maharashtra, Gujarat and
Assam that enacted market-oriented reforms did not necessarily raise their farm incomes significantly in
the period between 2000 - 2012.
The wide variation in state-level agricultural policies and regulatory frameworks between 1987 - 2012
provide us with a quasi-experimental setting to test whether agricultural reforms actually contributed to
higher farm incomes? To answer this question, this paper uses the data on state-level real farm income
from Basu and Misra (2022) to estimate the causal impact of market-oriented reforms on average farm
incomes per cultivator in a difference-in-differences framework. Since an analysis of state-level farm
5

incomes reduces the sample size of our analysis, we complement this with an analysis of farm incomes at
the individual level constructed using the Employment and Unemployment Rounds of the National Sample
Survey data between 2000 – 2012.
To ascertain whether a state adopted market reforms we conducted archival research of the academic
literature, government reports and newspaper articles. Since a causal interpretation of the impact of
reforms on wages relies on the randomness of reform allocation across states, we control for state-level
macro and agricultural factors and check for pre-existing trends. There are three main findings of our
paper.
First, our difference-in-differences estimation shows that states that adopted market-friendly reforms
between 2000 and 2012 did not increase their farm incomes or agricultural wages relative to states that
did not change their agricultural marketing system. Thus, by itself, market-oriented reforms did not have
any positive impact on agricultural incomes or wages.
Second, by exploiting the regional and temporal variation in marketing reforms and public procurement
of food grains in a triple difference framework, and after controlling for state level factors, state, and time
fixed effects and for place-specific linear time trends, we find that farm incomes and agricultural wages
are higher in states where market reforms and robust public procurement systems coexisted. The
guarantee of procurement at minimum support prices may create a price floor for farmers and help them
negotiate higher prices in negotiations with private traders and corporations. States that benefitted from
public procurement and adopted market-oriented reforms witnessed a differential farm income increase
of around 0.39 (natural) log points. This translates to an annual increase of around 2891 INR per annum
between 2000 - 2012. Similarly, daily agricultural incomes in these states witnessed a differential increase
of around 0.53 (natural) log points from a baseline mean of around 42 INR (in real terms) in 1999 - 2000.
This translated into an annual increase of around 22 INR (in real terms) per day during the period 2000 2012.
Finally, by decomposing the impact of public procurement between wheat and rice, we find that higher
agricultural wages were correlated with rice procurement and not wheat procurement. This disparity
between rice and wheat prices is also highlighted in the existing empirical literature. For instance, Chatterji
and Kapur (2016) also find that market prices for wheat are lower in districts with procurement.
There are three main contributions of this paper. First, we contribute to the debate on the role of reforms
in raising farm incomes by analyzing the experience of Indian states that adopted market-oriented reforms
6

between 2000 and 2012. We show that market-oriented reforms by themselves are not sufficient to raise
farm incomes. Second, this paper provides the first empirical evidence on the impact of both marketoriented reforms and public procurement on farm incomes to show that states that adopted a diversified
market structure coupled with a robust system of procurement did significantly better in raising farm
incomes. This paper argues that the experience of Indian states between 2000 – 2012 suggests that public
procurement complements market-oriented reforms. This is contrary to the existing discourse that views
public procurement and market-oriented reforms as competing policy alternatives for raising farm
incomes.
Finally, the results in this paper contribute to the political economy of agrarian change by discussing how
farmer incomes may be sensitive to policy choices and availability of institutional support to farmers.
Further, changes in factor price and collective bargaining may significantly impact farm incomes and
agricultural wages in the countryside.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the agricultural sector
and the role of marketing farm laws in India. Section 3 discusses the data and empirical strategies used in
the paper and Section 4 presents an analysis of the main results of the paper. Section 5 disaggregates the
impact of procurement between wheat and rice and section 6 concludes the paper an agenda for future
research and some policy recommendations.
2.

Context

The process of structural transformation which reduced agricultural labor force and its contribution to
India’s GDP started in the 1970s (Michler, 2020). The subsequent changes in the rural economy have been
both, confounding for policymakers and distressing for millions of workers in the agrarian economy. Given
the variation in regional agricultural experience across states and regions and the limitations of data, an
analysis of the salient features of India’s structural transformation is difficult. However, to better
understand the crisis in Indian agriculture, we summarize some expected and some unexpected features
of the agrarian economy.
2.1 Overview of India’s Agricultural Sector
Agricultural production in India started rising since the Green Revolution of 1960s. Factors significant
advances in production technology, intensity of input use and price guarantees by the government
contributed to higher production and productivity gains in agriculture. However, major gains in
productivity and public subsidies were confined to cereals like wheat and rice.
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Agricultural production in India peaked in the 1980s and started declining subsequently. The growth rate
in agriculture started declining from around 4 percent per year in the 1990s to around 2 percent per year
in 2000s (Mathur, Das and Sircar, 2003). Both food and non-food crops witnessed a decline, but food
grains productions recovered briefly around mid-1990s but declined again in the 2000s. This decline in
national-level agricultural growth masks the wide variation in agricultural growth at the state-level. For
instance, during the 1993 – 2003 decade, states like West Bengal, Bihar (with Jharkhand) Andhra Pradesh
and Kerala witnessed rapid agricultural growth. However, states like Odisha, Gujarat and Maharashtra
witnessed negative growth rates (Mathur, Das and Sircar, 2003).
The stagnation in agricultural growth has paradoxically, coincided with rapid extension of irrigation and
access to fertilizers which significantly improved the productivity of land in comparison to improvements
in productivity per worker (Michler, 2020). Further, the economic reforms of 1990s were expected to
improve the terms of trade in favor of agriculture and provide an impetus for agricultural growth.
However, agricultural growth and crop diversification after economic reforms of 1990s stagnated (Bhalla
and Singh, 2010). Since India’s agricultural sector is labor abundant, technological innovation has focused
on the relatively scarce resource, namely land. (Ruttan and Hayami, 1990). As improvements in land
productivity were driven by increased intensity of input use. Correspondingly, the decline in the last three
decades was caused primarily by diminishing returns to input use (Mukherjee and Kuroda, 2003; Nin Pratt,
yu and Fan, 2008; Michler, 2020; Wong et al., 2020).
As agricultural productivity and growth started stagnating, the share of farm incomes in total household
incomes started declining as rural households diversified their income sources by greater participation in
nonfarm activities offered by rural industry which concentrated in low wage regions (Foster and
Rosenzweig, 2004; Foster et al., 2016). During the same period, rates of crop diversification within
agriculture did not change significantly even when crop prices and productivity rates differed significantly
between food and nonfood crops (Rahman, 2009; Basu and Misra, 2022). This income diversification at
the extensive margin and the relative absence of crop diversification at the intensive margin suggests that
rural distress was a pan agriculture phenomenon and not conditional on crop choice, market demand or
public procurement.3

Therefore, the acute distress in the farming sector may have significantly

contributed to declining agricultural labor in India.

3

For instance, if over production led to a decline in cereal prices inadequate public procurement reduced the
demand for cereals, farmers may have shifted to other crops to augment their incomes and reduce their reliance on
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Basu and Misra (2022) document the trends in farm incomes across Indian states during 1987 – 2012.
During 2004 – 2012, farm incomes grew rapidly providing some relief to farmers but growth rates in
income have plummeted since 2012 (Chand, Saxena and Rana, 2015). Further, increased trade and
production in agricultural commodities led to a steady decline in the growth rate of agricultural prices
during the period 1900 – 2004 (Mathur, Das and Sircar, 2003). This stagnation in agricultural prices was
coupled with raising agricultural wages on account of public employment guarantee since 2005 (Azam,
2012; Zimmermann, 2012; Berg et al., 2018; Misra, 2019). Correspondingly, farm incomes may have been
squeezed between rising labor costs and stagnant agricultural prices.
As the impetus provided by the Green Revolution technologies and large public infrastructure projects of
the 1960s and 1970s started weakening, the importance of government expenditure in rural capital
formation and input subsidies increased. However, since the 1980, capital formation in agriculture is
financed primarily by private capital (Rao and Gulati, 1994; Gulati and Bathla, 2001). According to the
2017-18 Economic Survey of India, the share of the public sector in the gross capital formation in
agriculture since 2011-12 was less than 3 percent of the Gross Value Added (GVA) in agriculture while the
corresponding figure for private capital formation was around 15 percent. Complementing the decline in
public capital investment in agriculture, input subsidies for fertilizers, electricity and irrigation also
declined since 2000-01 which further attenuated the crisis in the agrarian sector (Mathur, Das and Sircar,
2003).
Therefore, the stagnation of agricultural incomes, diminishing input elasticity of production and a
reduction in public investment in agriculture constitute the push factors which may have contributed to
large scale labor movement away from agriculture. Unsurprisingly, according to the World Bank Data, the
proportion of labor force engaged in agriculture has fallen from around 70 percent in 1980s to around 44
percent in 2015. Historical experience of structural transformation may suggest that this exodus of
workers from agriculture would reduce the population pressure on agriculture and raise real incomes of
farmers who continue to stay behind (Ray, 1990). However, given the rates of population growth, the
absolute number of people dependent on agriculture continues to rise (Michler, 2020). Moreover, the
rate of labor movement out of agriculture has not kept pace with the decline in agriculture’s share in the
GDP. For instance, between 1980 and 2015, the share of agriculture in India’s GDP fell at a rate of 1.65
percent per annum while employment in agriculture fell by only 1.04 percent (Briones and Felipe, 2013).
cereal production. However, trends in agricultural income show that rural distress was not conditional on crop
choice.
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The evidence suggests that not only is agriculture the largest employer, its role as the employer of last
resorts has also not changed. Unsurprisingly, average landholding size has decreased and effective
landless has increased since the 1970s (Basole and Basu, 2011).
Since early 2000s, focus of agricultural policies shifted towards increasing market competition for
agricultural commodities by allowing private corporations to buy directly from farmers and the use of eplatforms to link markets across states. The Model APMC Act of 2003 provided states with a framework
to undertake market-integration and reform the marketing of agricultural commodities by reducing the
primacy of government regulated markets (mandis) and facilitating direct trade between farmers and
large private corporations. While the Model AMPC Act argued for the deregulation of agricultural markets,
the actual implementation of these policy recommendations was left to the states. Correspondingly, there
has been a significant variation in the policy choices and agricultural performance between states since
early 2000s. The next section discusses the variation in the experience of different states in adopting these
marketing reforms.
2.2 Marketing Reforms
Given the regulatory framework governing the sale and marketing of agricultural commodities, the role
of the government in determining agricultural prices and market access for farmers has received
considerable scrutiny in the past few years. It is argued that under the highly restrictive provisions of the
Agricultural Produce and Markets Commission (APMC) Act of 1930s and the Essential Commodities Act of
1955, the ability of private players to transport, purchase, store and export food grains is stymied
(Chatterjee & Kapur, 2016; Purohit et al., 2017). While these regulations were intended to ensure that
farmers could be paid a high price, by restricting market access and competition, the mandi system ended
up (unintentionally) reducing mutually beneficial open market transactions which kept farm incomes
depressed in many states.
However, recent empirical research using secondary data and ethnographic studies on state and national
level data on prices, procurement and market access has revealed the monopsonistic and spatially
segregated nature of agricultural markets where the MSP and actual procurement by licensed buyers in
the mandis, not only provide an income safety net for farmers but also serves as a price floor necessary
for farmers to negotiate a higher price from private players outside the mandis (Chatterjee et al., 2020;
Chatterjee & Krishnamurthy, 2021).
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Moreover, the absence of storage facilities and non-negligible transportation costs, reduces the ability of
producers, who are predominantly marginal or small farmers to negotiate with private traders. The
commission agents or arthiyas address this institutional failure by aligning the interests of the agents with
those of the farmer. Since the arthiyas earn a percentage of the total revenue earned by farmers, they
ensure that farmers get a high price. Therefore, the mandi system is uniquely suited to ensure collective
bargaining by farmers.
Whether the APMC system worked to benefit farmers or enriched the arthiyas may vary between states
and crops. To better understand the role of APMC framework and the impact of agricultural reforms, we
now discuss variations in marketing laws across the states.
Even before the new federal farm laws of 2020, Madhya Pradesh started reforming its agricultural sector
by diluting the role of mandis as the predominant sites of wholesale trade and allowing large
agribusinesses, supermarkets, and other private players to buy directly from farmers outside the APMC
framework (Krishnamurthy, 2012, 2021). In the next few years many other states adopted the
recommendations of the Model AMPC Act by either completely abolishing their mandi system like Bihar
or following a hybrid system of complementing the mandis with increased market access for private
corporations to buy directly from farmers like Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh. Figure 1 shows states that
adopted marketing reforms by year. States like Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Punjab did not adopt the
marketing-reforms recommended by the Model APMC Act.
Interestingly, the pre-existing growth rates did not influence states to select marketing reforms. For
instance, states that did not enact reforms included West Bengal and Punjab which witnessed rapid
agricultural growth during 1993 – 2003. Similarly, states like Bihar, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh which
enacted reforms also witnessed high rates of agricultural growth in the decade preceding the model APMC
Act. Conversely, both reform (treatment) and non-reform (control) groups comprised of states with low
rates of agricultural growth. Treatment states like Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh had negative growth rates
while control states like Kerala witnessed lowest agricultural growth rate of -18.6 percent. However,
average farm incomes in control states were higher than those in treatment states as shown in Figure 2.
In the next section, we will discuss trends in farm incomes and agricultural wages between states that
adopted market reforms and those that did not.4

4

Section 3.1.b provides details of state-level marketing reforms.
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2.3 Impact of Reforms on Real Farm Incomes
Figure 2 presents the trends in the natural log of average farm income per cultivator for states that
adopted market-oriented reforms and those between 2004 – 2012 (treatment states) and those that did
not (control states). Farm incomes for all states have risen during the period 1987 – 2012 and show some
evidence of convergence between states. States that did not enact market-oriented reforms started with
higher real farm incomes in 1987-88 and which continued for over two decades till 2012. While treatment
states witnessed an increase in farm incomes, this was less than that witnessed by control states which
suggests that market-oriented reforms may not have contributed to a rise in farm incomes in treatment
states. However, since control states started with higher real farm incomes, it can be argued that states
with low levels of pre-reform farm incomes enacted chose to enact reforms. Therefore, comparing control
and treatment states may not allow us to causally estimate the impact of reforms.
Figure 3 shows the trends in the natural log of daily agricultural wages during the period 1987 – 2012 for
control and treatment states. Agricultural wages follow similar trends between control and treatment
districts during the entire period. As can be seen from figure 2, daily agricultural wages (in real terms) for
all states are rising during the period 1987 – 2009 and is declining between 2010 – 2012. Based on our
discussion in Section 2.1 we can see that trends in agricultural wages are correlated with agricultural
productivity and output. For instance, agricultural growth rates stagnated in the 1990s, the growth of
agricultural wages also slowed between 1994 – 2000. Further, following the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (NREGA) of 2005, agricultural wages started rising rapidly. Finally, as the budgetary
allocation to NREGA started declining since 2010, agricultural wages started declining.
2.4 Food Procurement by FCI
Figure 4 shows trends in the procurement of wheat and rice by the Food Corporation of India between
2000 – 2012. We can see from the figure that the proportion of food grains procured from control states
has remained constant throughout the period while procurement from Madhya Pradesh that undertook
marketing reforms in 2004 increased rapidly. States like Himachal Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh which
adopted reforms in 2005 continued to benefit from high procurement rates throughout the period. The
trends in procurement proportions suggest that increased market access provided by the reforms did not
crowd-out the supply of food grains to the FCI as states either increased or maintained relatively stable
procurement proportions. If increased market access provided farmers with better prices, farmers would
have reduced their dependence on public procurement. However, the trends show that procurement not
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only provides income support to farmers but also creates a price floor for price negotiation by the
farmers.5
3.

Data and Empirical Strategies

This section will first present the data and discuss the empirical strategies used in this paper.
3.1 Data and Variable Construction
This section describes the construction of two outcome variables namely, state-level annual farm income
measures and daily agricultural wages. Next, we discuss the archival research of state-level farm laws
which helped us determining the state’s reform status. Finally, we describe the procurement data from
the Food Corporation of India. Table 2 presents the summary statistics for variables used in this paper and
Appendix A discusses their construction in greater detail.
a. Farm Incomes
There are three main sources of farm income data in the empirical literature. First, sample surveys like
the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS) collect information on various labor and non-labor
inputs used in cultivation. This dataset also collects information on the value of total output produced by
the farmer. Farm incomes can be calculated as a difference between the input costs and the sale price of
the output (Deininger et al., 2017). The REDS data collects information from around 17 major states, with
the latest round of data corresponding to the agricultural season 2005-2006. Therefore, this data cannot
be used to construct measures of farm incomes after 2006. Further, since the access to markets enjoyed
by farmers may vary by location and farm size, the prices obtained by farmers may vary. This may create
difficulties in aggregating sample survey data on agricultural incomes to construct estimates of state-level
farm incomes. Finally, while the REDS dataset collects information about marketed inputs like hired labor,
fertilizer, seeds, and the cost of rented machinery, it does not include the cost of unpaid family labor
which may lead to overestimation of agricultural incomes.
Second, the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP) of the Ministry of Agriculture present
details of input costs since the 1970s (Raghavan, 2008). These costs can be subtracted from the value of
agricultural output to create estimates of farm income. Under the Comprehensive Scheme for Studying

5

States that contributed to food procurement by the FCI remained relatively constant throughout the period 1999
– 2012. All rice procurement was done from Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh (and Chhattisgarh),
Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Similarly, 90 percent of wheat procurement was done from
Bihar (and Jharkhand), Gujarat, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh (and Chhattisgarh), Punjab, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar
Pradesh.
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the Cost of Cultivation of Principal Crops in India, the Directorate of Economics and Statistics collects data
on the input cost of factors like labor and machinery. Additionally, this data also includes the imputed
labor cost to account for household labor. However, there are two main limitations of this data. First, the
CACP only estimates the cost of cultivation for the major crops for which the government announces the
minimum support prices. This excludes over half the total crops cultivated by farmers in India. Second,
there is considerable variation in the wholesale price index between districts with APMC mandis and those
without mandis (Chatterjee and Kapur, 2016). Therefore, constructing estimates of the sale price of
agricultural output may not be straightforward even for crops for which CACP data exists.
Finally, the third measure of farm income is constructed by subtracting the total wage bill from the total
value added in agriculture in a state (Chand, Saxena and Rana, 2015). Data on agricultural value added is
published by the Reserve Bank of India6 and data on the total wage bill in agriculture is constructed using
various rounds the Employment and Unemployment Surveys of the National Sample Survey Organization
data.7 The estimates of farm income are then divided by the number of cultivators to construct estimates
of average farm income per cultivator in each state. This measure is finally deflated using the Consumer
Price Index for Rural Laborers published by the Labor Bureau of India. There are many advantages of using
this measure of farm income. First, this estimate does not rely on assumptions of uniform market access
to farmers across states. Existing studies have shown that farm incomes and access to markets is
conditional on farm size, distance from the market, government procurement and crop choice (Sarap,
1990; Takeshima et al., 2012; Deininger et al., 2017; Chatterjee et al., 2020). Second, this measure allows
us to construct estimates of average real farm incomes in a state for all farmers (including those growing
crops for which CACP data does not exist) for the period 1987-88 to 2011-12. However, our measure of
real farm incomes does not include the imputed costs of family labor and the rental cost of cultivating
own land, taxes, and subsidies. Therefore, our estimates may be considered as upper bounds of farm
incomes across states in India.
b. Agricultural Wages
While estimates of annual farm incomes constructed by subtracting the agricultural wage bill from total
value added provides us with state-level farm incomes, this measure does not account for district-level
6

Table 6, Components of Net State Domestic Product at Factor Cost by Industry of Origin, Handbook of Statistics
on Indian Economy. See
https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/AnnualPublications.aspx?head=Handbook%20of%20Statistics%20on%20Indian%20
Economy
7
Appendix A provides the details of variable construction.
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variation between agricultural prices and incomes. Further, this measure significantly reduces our sample
size, which, in turn, reduces the precision of our estimates. To address these concerns, we complement
our analysis of state-level average, annual real farm incomes with an analysis of daily real wages for
agricultural workers using unit-level data from various rounds of the nationally representative
Employment and Unemployment Surveys of the National Sample Survey (NSS) Organization. The unitlevel data used in the analysis corresponds to the 43rd round (1987-88), the 50th round (1992-93), the
55th (1999-00), the 61st round (2004-05), the 64th round (2007-08), the 66th round (2009-10) and the
68th round (2011-12) of the national sample survey.
One advantage of using individual level data is that we are able to control for unobservable factors at the
district level (using dummy variables for districts). However, since state and district boundaries have
changed significantly between 1987 and 2012, we could not match all of the current districts across all
NSS rounds. For our empirical analysis, therefore, we restricted our sample to 150 districts across 14 major
states which could be unambiguously identified across all rounds between 1999 -2000 and 2011 -2012.
Since agricultural wages differ by seasons, we create a measure for daily wages and constructed a measure
for daily real agricultural wages by deflating the nominal wages by the Consumer Price Index for Rural
Laborers published by the Labor Bureau of India
c. Reform Variable
Several states have been reforming their agricultural policies since the early 2000s. Madhya Pradesh
spearheaded the reforms by adopting alternative marketing channels for cash crops like soy (Goyal, 2020)
and food crops like wheat (Krishnamurthy, 2021). Large firms like ITC to procure directly from farmers
outside the mandis (Krishnamurthy, 2021). The scale and scope of these reforms accelerated after the
Model APMC Act was passed in 2003. To take another example, in 2006, Bihar completely abolished the
APMC mandi system (Kishore et al., 2021). Similarly, Gujarat also implemented all reforms and reduced
actual procurement in 2006.
Other states like Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Haryana partially
implemented the reforms. These states allowed mandis to operate but also allowed farmers to sell in
open markets, including trading in various e-markets across the country (Aggarwal et al., 2017; Ramesh
Chand & Singh, 2016; Ghosh, 2013). At the other end of the spectrum were states like Punjab, Tamil Nadu,
Tripura, Kerala, and West Bengal, where none of the marketing reforms proposed by the APMC Act of
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2003 were adopted. Uttar Pradesh initially adopted the reforms in 2004 but following widespread
opposition from farmer organizations, the state government withdrew the reforms (Ghosh, 2013).
The existing literature tracks reform progress along several parameters including contract farming,
decentralizing sales by setting up of private mandis, single license for state-wide traders, rationalizing of
taxes on agricultural commodities, extension of e-trading facilities and joining the e-NAM initiative by
linking mandis to the national electronic trading portal (Purohit et al., 2017). Chand and Singh (2016) rank
Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan as the top states implementing market friendly reforms while Jammu
Kashmir, Tamil Nadu and Uttarakhand are among the worst performing states on their reform index.
Most states have made some efforts to expand e-trading and use of technology enabled price
dissemination services in the last decade. The major difference between state-level policy framework
exists in the role of APMC mandis as the primary site of transactions between licensed buyers and farmers.
Further, the primary opposition of farmers to the September 2020 Farm Law Amendments also revolved
around the role of APMC mandis, licensed agents (arhatiyas) and the MSP. Correspondingly, this paper
focuses on state-level reforms that diversified markets for farmers and reduced the ability (dependence)
of farmers to sell in APMC mandis. We construct a binary reform variable that takes the value 1 if farmers
could sell to private players (either exclusively or along with APMC mandis) and 0 otherwise.
To construct this reform variable, we conducted archival research of state-level policies by analyzing
various annual reports of the Ministry of Agriculture and Framer’s Welfare, academic research, and
newspaper articles. There were two main objectives of this research. First, we wanted to ascertain
whether farmers sold primarily in the APMC mandis or whether they were free to sell directly in the open
market. Second, we wanted to know if the state government had reformed the previous APMC Act, and
if it did, to ascertain the year in which this change took effect? The process of classifying states into reform
(treatment) and non-reform (control) states is described below.
The reform status for some states was easy to infer. For instance, Bihar completely abolished the APMC
system in 2006 (Kishore et al., 2021) and states like Maharashtra and Gujarat have introduced many
significant policy changes to reduce the primacy of mandis and deregulate the entry of private
corporations. Correspondingly, these states have high scores on all published reform indices. There is
general consensus in the literature that these states are top reformers in the country. On the other hand,
states like Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Jammu and Kashmir have not adopted the Model APMC reforms.
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Similarly, states like Punjab and West Bengal have not altered their mandi system. Correspondingly, these
states have been classified as states in the control group.
For other states like Uttar Pradesh, Assam, and Tripura, assigning the reform classification was not
straightforward. We relied extensively on academic research, published reports, newspaper articles and
ethnographic research to determine whether farmers in these states had access to mandis or not (R
Chand, 2020; Ramesh Chand & Singh, 2016; Ghosh, 2013; Purohit et al., 2017). For states like Odisha,
Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh which developed a hybrid marketing system, we defined the reform
variable based on academic studies and reports. For instance, Chatterji et al. (2020) document the
pluralistic market system in Odisha which includes multiple licensing authorities, private markets, and
Regulated Market Committees (RMCs). Correspondingly, mandis are not the only sites for exchange.
Based on this evidence, we classified Odisha as a reform state. Similarly, the significant progress made by
Karnataka in expanding market access for private corporations and linking their markets to e-NAM
initiatives are well documented in the literature (Aggarwal et al., 2017). Madhya Pradesh’s economic
reforms, infrastructure development and robust public procurement system are identified as major
drivers of its rapid agricultural growth between 2005 – 2015 (Gulati et al., 2017). Similarly, Haryana also
implemented several market-oriented reforms since 2006 but continued a robust system of government
procurement of both wheat and rice. Since farmers in both these states could sell in the open market and
in APMC mandis we classify these as reform states in this paper.
Finally, for states that were classified as reformed, assigning the date of reform implementation was
another challenge. The Annual Reports published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmer’s Welfare
since 2016 provide details of reform status for most states. However, these Reports do not provide
information on the timing of these reforms. In order to assign the reform year, we relied on extant
literature and newspaper reports. For instance, Madhya Pradesh had allowed private corporations to buy
directly from farmers since 2000 (Goyal, 2020). However, it was only by 2004 that warehouses facilitating
direct sales to private buyers were established in the state. Correspondingly, we assign 2004 as the date
of marketing reforms for Madhya Pradesh. Similarly, Ghosh (2013) documents a history of APMC reforms
for several states which helps us assign treatment dates for Andhra Pradesh, Assam, and Himachal
Pradesh.
Table 1 presents the reform status for each of the 18 states analyzed in this paper. This table also lists the
major source of archival information on the reform status and timing. Our reform variable can be
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compared to the composite reform index constructed by Chand and Singh (2016) and Purohit et al.(2017).
While these papers present an index of reform focusing on various parameters, we restrict our analysis to
the reforms pertaining to market access and the functioning of AMPCs in states. Our reform variable is
comparable to Chand and Singh (2016) for all states except Assam, and Odisha.
The major difference relates to the actual procurement and functioning of the mandis. For instance,
Assam and Odisha score only 37 and 28 on a 100-point reform scale constructed by Chand and Singh
(2016). However, our research suggests that farmers in these states do not predominantly rely on APMC
mandis to sell their crops and that private markets have been operational in these states for over a
decade. While these states have reformed their agricultural marketing system, they have not made
significant progress in expanding their e-trading infrastructure and have not joined the e-NAM initiative.
This may account for their low scores on the Chand-Singh composite reform index (Ramesh Chand &
Singh, 2016). Since these states allow for direct sale by farmers, we are classifying them as reform
(treatment) states for this analysis.
d. Procurement
The role of market-oriented reforms in raising farm incomes has received a lot attention in the past year.
However, the issue of allocative inefficiencies and market distortions created by the procurement of food
grains by the Food Corporation of India has dominated the discourse on India’s agricultural crisis since the
economic reforms of 1990. Market-oriented reforms, public procurement of food grains and the MSP are
intimately related to each other. Hence, we would like to bring in the dimension of procurement and MSP
into our analysis of the impact of market-oriented reforms on farm incomes. What complicates the picture
of procurement is its significant diversity across crops and regions of India. While the government
announces the MSP for several food and non-food crops including jowar, bajra, tur, groundnut, barley,
sugarcane, and cotton, the FCI primarily buys wheat and rice from the APMC mandis. Since 1999-2000,
Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh have dominated the procurement of wheat and rice by the FCI. The
procurement of wheat is primarily concentrated in Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, and West Bengal.
Table 3 presents an overview of the trends in procurement of wheat and rice by the FCI as a proportion of
total production in a state using the data on procurement released by the FCI and the data on total production
given by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics.
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3.2 Empirical Strategy
The main goal of this paper is to estimate the causal impact of marketing reforms on farm incomes and
agricultural wages. In this section, we discuss our empirical strategies and discuss possible threats to
identification of causal effects.
a.

Difference-in-Differences

Since there is significant regional and temporal variation in the adoption of market friendly reforms by
states, we adopt a difference-in-differences estimation method to estimate the causal impact of these
reforms on average, state-level, real farm incomes. Our regression specification takes the following form.
𝑦𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜑𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡

(1)

where s and t are indexes for states and periods, 𝑦𝑠𝑡 is the natural log of annual real farm income per
cultivator, 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state enacted marketing reforms and 0
otherwise, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is after the year of reform for a given
state, 𝑋𝑠𝑡 corresponds to state-level macro controls like the log of state GPD, population and tax revenue,
𝐻𝑠𝑡 includes state-level agricultural controls like the number of agricultural workers, productivity of wheat
and rice and the proportion of wheat and rice procured by the FCI; 𝜏𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑𝑠 are period and state fixed
effects respectively. Standard errors 𝜀𝑠𝑡 are adjusted for correlations at the state level.8
The main coefficient of interest is 𝛽1 which measures the change in real wages in reform states after they
adopted market friendly reforms relative to the corresponding change in real farm incomes in states that
did not adopt these reforms. We face three challenges in estimating a causal effect. First, the sample size
of our analysis using state-level annual farm-incomes is small, which can impact the precision of our
estimates. Second, the difference-in-differences estimation relies on the random allocation of treatment
across the population (Heckman et al. 1997). Our difference-in-differences estimate of the causal effect
of market-oriented reforms would be biased if farm incomes in reform states are trending differentially
from those in non-reform states or if market-oriented reforms were correlated with excluded control
variables. Finally, since the adoption of market-oriented reforms by a state is ascertained by archival
research, the impact of reforms may be conditional on the inclusion (or exclusion) of certain states as

8

In our empirical analysis, 𝑠 = 1,2, … , 18, is the index for the 18 states in our sample, and 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 7, is the index
for the following 7 time periods for which the we have data from the national sample survey: 1987-88, 1993-94,
1999-00, 2004-05, 2007-08, 2009-10 and 2011-12. The complete list of control variables appears in the footnote to
Table 2.
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reform states. Section 3 discusses how our reform status differs from that of Chand and Singh (2016) for
Assam and Odisha. We discuss each of these concerns in detail below.
First, since real value added in agriculture is only available at the state level, we cannot construct farm
incomes at a more disaggregated level. However, we address this concern by complementing our analysis
of state-level farm incomes with an analysis of agricultural wages. Data on the daily agricultural real wages
can be constructed at the individual level from different rounds of the nationally representative sample
survey (as we have explained in section 3.1). An additional advantage of using individual-level data from
the national sample surveys is that we are able to control for unobservable confounders at the district
level. We do so by estimating our model on a pooled cross-section data set by restricting observations to
150 districts that we could consistently identify across the national sample survey rounds from 1987-88
to 2011-12.
Our individual-level difference-in-differences model is the following:
𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑡 = = 𝛽1 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜑𝑑 + 𝛿𝑑 × 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑑𝑡

(2)

where i, d and t are indexes for individuals, districts and time periods, 𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑡 is the natural log of real daily
agricultural wage, 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑑 is a dummy equal to 1 if the district is part of a state that enacted marketing
reforms and 0 otherwise, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy equal to 1 if the observation is after the year of reform for a
given state, 𝑋𝑑𝑡 corresponds to district-level controls like the agricultural controls like the number of
cultivators and agricultural productivity. 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑡 includes individual-level controls like the age, gender,
religion, and caste of the induvial; 𝜏𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑𝑑 are year-quarter and district fixed effects respectively. Since
we cannot control for all district level factors, we also include district-level linear time trend
𝛿𝑑 × 𝑡. Standard errors 𝜀𝑖𝑑𝑡 are adjusted for correlations at the district level. The main coefficient of
interest is 𝛽1 which measures the change in daily real wages in reform states after they adopted market
friendly reforms relative to the evolution of daily real wages in states that did not adopt these reforms.9
Second, most states adopted market-oriented reforms after the Model APMC Act of 2003 which provided
states with a blueprint for reforms. However, whether a state adopted the recommendations of the
Model APMC Act could be correlated with factors like incomes, population, agricultural productivity, and
public procurement. We address this concern partly by controlling for observable differences between

9

The sample for estimating this model has individual-level observations from 150 districts in 14 major states for
the years 1999-00, 2004-05, 2007-08, 2009-10 and 2011-12.
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reform and non-reform states. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for these controls. We see that these
macro and agricultural variables are not statistically different between treatment and control states.
However, unobservable factors may impact farm incomes, causing treatment and control states to have
divergent trends in farm incomes before they adopted market-oriented reforms. Hence, we test if
treatment and control states followed different trends in real farm incomes following Muralidharan and
Prakash (2017)
𝑦𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜑𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡

(3)

where s and t are indexes for states and time periods, 𝑦𝑠𝑡 denotes either the natural log average real farm
income or the natural log of daily real wage in state 𝑠 in period t, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is a continuous indicator for year
(1 for 1987-88 and 3 for 1999-00). To test the parallel trends assumption, we estimate model (3) for all
pre-market reform years (1987-88, 1993-94 and 1999-00). The estimate of 𝛽1 in model (3) can be seen in
Table 4. The coefficient is statistically insignificant. This is evidence in favor of the parallel trends
assumption, the key identifying assumption for the validity of the DD research design.
Finally, to account for differences in the reform status of Assam and Odisha, we also estimate the
difference-in-differences specification of equation (1) and equation (2) using the composite reform index
of Chand and Singh (2016) – because their treatment of Assam and Odisha are different from what we
identify through our archival research. In this specification, if a state scores more than 50 on a 100-point
reform index constructed by Chand and Singh (2016), we consider it a reform/treatment state (reform
dummy equal to 1) and control state otherwise. We find that the results of the difference-in-differences
specification are qualitatively similar even when we use the Chand and Singh reform classification. This
may suggest that our results are not sensitive to the identification of Assam and Odisha as reform (or nonreform) states.
b.

Triple Difference

Next, we test how market-oriented reforms interact with public procurement by the FCI to impact farm
incomes using a triple difference framework given below.
𝑦𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐻𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜑𝑠 + 𝛿𝑠 × 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡

(4)

21

where s and t are indexes for states and time periods, 𝑦𝑠𝑡 is the natural log of annual real farm income
per cultivator, 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 is a dummy equal to 1 if the state enacted marketing reforms and 0 otherwise.
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡

is a dummy equal to 1 if the observation is after the year of reform for a given state;

𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 is a dummy equal to 1 if the FCI procured grains form the state and 0 otherwise; 𝑋𝑠𝑡
corresponds to state level controls discussed in Table 2; 𝜏𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑𝑠 are period and state fixed effects
respectively. Additionally, we also include state-specific linear time trends (𝛿𝑠 × 𝑡 ) to control for
potentially heterogenous pre-program trends. Standard errors 𝜀𝑠𝑡 are clustered at the state level to take
account of possible correlation of unobserved factors over time for each state.
The coefficient of interest, 𝛽1 , measures the differential change in real farm income per cultivator in
reform states from which the FCI procured wheat or rice after market-oriented reforms were adopted in
these states. Similar to the differences-in-difference specification, the validity of the triple difference
estimator depends on the exogeneity of the procurement variable. We address this concern in three ways.
First, Figure 3 shows trends in procurement across treatment and control states during the period
between 1999-00 and 2011-12. As can be seen from the figure, trends in procurement for all states except
Madhya Pradesh United (which adopted reforms in 2004) remains consistent throughout the period.
While MP United witnessed a rapid rise in the quantum of procurement, Table 3 shows that procurement
as a proportion of total output in the state remained relatively stable throughout the period. Next, we
include state-specific linear time trends to control for differential trends in procurement between
treatment and control states.
Second, we complement our analysis of state-level average, real, annual farm incomes with individual
level daily real agricultural wages using the individual-level NSS data from a pooled cross-section data set
for 14 major states and 5 time periods (1999-00, 2004-05, 2007-08, 2009-10 and 2011-12). We restrict
the sample to observations for 150 districts that we can consistently identify for all these time period.
More specifically, we estimate the following triple difference specification.
𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑋𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜑𝑑 + 𝛿𝑑 × 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡

(5)

where i, d, s and t are indexes for individuals, districts, states and time periods, 𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑡 is the natural log of
real daily agricultural wage, 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 is a dummy equal to 1 if the state enacted marketing reforms and
0 otherwise, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy equal to 1 if the observation is after the year of reform for a given state,
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𝑋𝑑𝑡 corresponds to district level agricultural controls like the number of cultivators and agricultural
productivity, 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑡 includes individual level controls like the age, gender, religion, and caste of the induvial,
𝜏𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑𝑑 are year-quarter and district fixed effects respectively. Since we cannot control for all district
level factors, we also include district-level linear time trend 𝛿𝑑 × 𝑡. Standard errors 𝜀𝑖𝑑𝑡 are adjusted for
correlations at the district level.
Third, we test for pre-program trends for the triple difference specification by estimating the following
specification:
𝑦𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑠 × 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑋𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐻𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜑𝑑 + 𝛿𝑑 × 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑡

(6)

where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is a continuous indicator for year-quarter, and all other variables are the same as those
described in equation (5) above. In table 5 we show the results for the parallel trends regressions of
equations for the difference-in-differences (DD) and triple difference (DDD) estimation of the parallel
trends regression using unit-level data for the pre-reform period. In both cases, the coefficient 𝛽1 is
statistically insignificant. Therefore, the parallel trends assumption is satisfied as we cannot reject the null
hypothesis.
Additionally, the appendix shows that our results are robust to several alternative specifications. For
instance, to account for a small number of clusters in our state-level regressions we bootstrap standard
errors using the method proposed in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008). We conduct placebo treatment
and demonstrate that our estimates are robust to the exclusion of different years and states from the
sample.
4.

Results
4.1 Impact of Reforms on Farm Incomes and Agricultural Wages

Table 6 presents the results of the difference-in-differences model represented by equation (1). Each
column shows the results of a different specification. Column (1) presents the naïve model without any
controls. Column (2) includes macro controls and column (3) presents the complete model with macro
and agricultural controls and state and year fixed effects. As can be seen from Table 6, market-oriented
reforms did not contribute to higher incomes in states that adopted these reforms. The results do not
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change even when we use the Chand and Singh (2016) classification of states based on a composite reform
index. In both cases, the log of real farm incomes increased by 0.02 log points. However, this result is not
statistically significant.
Since this paper presents the first estimates of changes in real farm incomes between states that enacted
market-oriented reforms and those that did not, we cannot compare our results directly with existing
studies. However, we compare our results with papers that study the impact of market reforms on similar
agricultural variables. For instance, using a composite index of agricultural reforms, Purohit et al. (2017)
show that reforms promoted agricultural growth and technology adoption. Similarly, Chand et al. (2015)
find that between the period 2004 – 2012, farm incomes grew at around 5.4 percent but this change was
caused by rising agricultural prices and a decline in the number of agricultural workers and cultivators.
These findings suggest that while agricultural reforms may have contributed to rising output of agricultural
commodities, farm incomes depended critically on the ability of farmers to negotiate with private buyers
for high prices. In the next section, we discuss how procurement by FCI might have impacted the
bargaining power of farmers and allowed them to capture beneficial impact of reforms when public
procurement generated a price floor.
Next, we analyze if agricultural reforms had an impact on daily real agricultural wages. The results are
shown in Table 7.10 Similar to the results for annual real farm-incomes, we find that agricultural reforms
did not have any impact on daily real agricultural wages. In column (3) of Table 7, we present our complete
specification including controls and district-level linear time trend. The coefficient is not statistically
significant.
4.2 Impact of Marketing Reforms and Public Procurement on Farm Incomes and Agricultural Wages
Tables 8 presents the results of the triple difference specifications of equations (4), which constitute the
main results of this paper. Each column presents a different specification. Column (4) presents the results
for the complete specification presented in equation (4). This table shows that in states that adopted
market-oriented reforms and where FCI procured wheat or rice, the log of real farm incomes increased
by around 0.39 log points even after we control for macro and agricultural controls, state and time fixed
effects and state-specific linear time trends. This corresponds to an increase of around 1,575 INR per
annum between 2005 – 2012 from a baseline mean of 28,282 INR in 2005.

10

The sample for estimating this model has individual-level observations from 150 districts in 14 major states for the
years 1999-00, 2004-05, 2007-08, 2009-10 and 2011-12.
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This suggests that real farm incomes benefitted from increased market access provided by reforms, but
that these gains were conditional on food grain procurement by the government. These results indicate
that agricultural commodity markets are highly monopsonistic. Private buyers of crops can depress prices
unless farmers can fall back on robust public procurement, which creates a price floor for agricultural
prices. These findings are consistent with existing research which studies price variations across
agricultural markets in India (Chatterjee and Kapur, 2016; Chatterjee et al., 2020).
Similar to the triple difference specification for farm incomes, Table 9 shows the results for the triple
difference specification of equation (5).11 Our preferred specification including all controls, year quarter
fixed effects and district level fixed effects and district specific time trends is shown in column (3). We find
that real agricultural wages rose by 0.53 percentage points in states that adopted market reforms and
benefitted from FCI procurement of wheat and rice. This translates into an increase of around 22 INR per
day during the period 2000 – 2012.
Existing studies suggest that composite market-oriented reforms may benefit agricultural growth and
production (Purohit et al., 2017). However, these impacts are driven by reductions in transaction costs
and greater technology adoption. The literature suggests that variations in farm prices have been a critical
determinant of agricultural growth (Mathur et al., 2003). Further, persistent variation in prices between
mandis within a state suggests that public procurement at MSP may be an important determinant of farm
incomes received by cultivators (Chatterjee & Kapur, 2016). Our triple difference results provide empirical
estimation in support of this hypothesis.
4.3 Decomposition of Triple Difference Results
The results in table 9 suggest that marketing reforms coupled with FCI procurement has a statistically
significant impact on agricultural wages. Does this result vary across major crops like rice and wheat? To
answer this question, we decompose the results by wheat and rice procurement at the state level. To be
more specific, we re-estimate equation (5) for rice and wheat separately. We find that our triple difference
results are primarily driven by the procurement of rice. Column (3) of Table 10 presents our preferred
specification for the triple difference for rice procurement (reform x post x rice procurement). We find
that the triple difference coefficient is 0.67 log points which is significant at the 1 percent level. This

11

The sample for estimating this model has individual-level observations from 150 districts in 14 major states for the
years 1999-00, 2004-05, 2007-08, 2009-10 and 2011-12.

25

implies that states that enacted market reforms and benefitted from the procurement of rice witnessed
a significant increase in real agricultural wages.
By contrast, the triple difference coefficient for wheat is -0.22 which is statistically insignificant. This
suggests that the impact of public procurement is concentrated in states from which the FCI procured rice
and the impact of wheat procurement on real agricultural wages is muted. The difference in the impact
of rice and wheat procurement is perplexing and is an issue that needs to be further investigated.
Someresults found in the extant literature provide some clues that reiterate this puzzle. For instance,
Chatterjee and Kapur (2016) find that market prices for wheat are lower in districts with procurement,
compared to those without procurement. If public procurement of wheat generates a price floor for the
farmers, then it is not clear why market prices should be lower in the presence of procurement.
Our results in Table 9 and 10 are robust to alternate specifications. For instance, in the appendix we show
that if we re-estimate equation (5) for states that only procured rice or states that only procured wheat,
the disparity in the effect of rice and wheat procurement still exists. Future research may shed greater
light on the causes of differences in the procurement of wheat and rice. While careful empirical analysis
of the difference between rice and wheat procurement may be needed to explain this result, we suggest
posisble factors that may explain this divergence between rice and wheat procurement. Rice procurement
shares (procurement as a share of production) across states have remained constant throughout the time
period 2000 – 2012. This consistency in procurement may have provided farmers with a credible price
floor to negotiate higher wages from private traders. By contrast, the proportions of wheat procured by
states varies during the time period under study. This may have created uncertainty over the volume of
wheat procurement from states like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Rajasthan. This uncertainly might have
diluted the effect of public procurement in these states.
5.

Conclusion

The three farm laws of September 2020 reignited the debate about the role of APMCs in improving the
livelihoods of cultivators and farm workers. Most studies have focused on how market competition and
the entry of large corporations may impact the prices received by farmers (Jodhka, 2021; Krishnamurthy,
2021) and how competition between buyers and greater flexibility in selling outside the mandis may
benefit the farmer (Chatterjee & Kapur, 2016; Gulati et al., 2020). This paper contributes to this literature
by presenting a causal analysis of the impact of market-oriented reforms on farm incomes and agricultural
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wages. We find that market-reforms, by themselves, did not have any impact on agricultural incomes and
wages during 2000 – 2012.
However, in states where these reforms were coupled with robust public procurement by the Food
Corporation of India, farm incomes and agricultural wages were significantly higher. This suggests that
market-oriented reforms and public procurement by the state may actually be complements which can
help reduce imperfections in agricultural markets by providing farmers with a credible price floor to
negotiate higher wages from private traders. Finally, by decomposing the composite effect of
procurement and reforms to the procurement of rice and wheat, we identify a puzzle: the positive effects
of procurement are visible only in rice procurement; the interaction of reforms and public procurement
does not generate any positive impact for wheat. More research is needed to address this puzzle.
Our analysis shows that agricultural prices and rural incomes depend on several institutional factors like
commission agents (arhatiyas) who may help address institutional failures, access to markets and ability
of farmers to collectively bargain for better prices with private traders and large corporations. The
evidence suggests that instead of conceptualizing the role of markets and states as substitutes, addressing
rural distress may require strengthening both the role of the state and market access for farmers. While
market reforms may be necessary to foster greater competition and price discovery, they are not
sufficient. The role of the state in providing farmers with a price floor by procuring food grains is critical
in increasing the bargaining power of farmers and ensuring that market reforms become successful in
raising farm incomes. Finally, in addition to the direct intervention by the state in correcting
monopsonistic tendencies in agricultural markets, the government can also strengthen farmers’
bargaining position indirectly by increasing public investment in agriculture. More specifically, investment
in storage facilities, improving market linkages and increasing the number of mandis may be beneficial in
ensuring that market reforms are successful.
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Figure 1: Reform Status by State
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Figure 2: Real Farm Incomes by Reform Status

Figure 3: Real Agricultural Wages by Reform Status
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Figure 4: FCI procurement by Reform Status
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Table 1: Marketing Reforms Across States
Marketing
State
Reform
Group
Jammu
&
0
Kashmir

Control States

Treatment in 2004
Treatment in 2005

Kerala

0

Punjab

0

Tamil Nadu

0

Tripura

0

Uttar
Pradesh
United
West Bengal
Madhya Pradesh
United
Andhra Pradesh
Himachal
Pradesh

Date of
Reform

Chand (2020),
Indian Express
Chand (2020),
Indian Express
Chatterji et
al.(2020)
Purohit at al.(2017)
Chand and Singh
(2016)

0

Ghosh (2013)

0
1

2004

1

2005

Ghosh (2013)
Krishnamurthi
(2012) Goyal (2020)
Ghosh (2013)

1

2005

Ghosh (2013)

Assam

1

2006

Bihar United

1

2006

Gujarat

1

2006

Ministry of
Agriculture and
Framer’s Welfare.
Annual Reports

Haryana

1

2006

Maharashtra

1

2006

Odisha

1

2006

Karnataka

1

2007

Rajasthan

1

Ghosh(2013) and
Purohit et al.(2017)
Kishore et al.(2021)
Ministry of
Agriculture and
Framer’s Welfare.
Annual Reports

Treatment in 2006

Treatment in 2007

Primary Source

2007

Ghosh (2013)
Chatterji et
al.(2020)
Agarwal et al.(2016)
Ministry of
Agriculture and
Framer’s Welfare.
Annual Reports

Note: Compiled by the authors
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable

Non-Reform States

Reform-States

p-value

Source

Ln Real Average Annual Income

10.76

10.25

0.09

Calculated by Authors

Ln (Daily Agricultural Wage)

6.67398

6.6302

0.807313

NSS

Rice Produced (in 000 tonnes)

6392.65

4420.17

0.45

DES, GOI

Wheat Produced (in 000 tonnes)

6493.80

3355.07

0.49

DES, GOI

Log of State Value added in
Agriculture

10.10

10.38

0.63

Reserve Bank of India

Population (in million)

60.07

60.21

0.96

Census of India

Agricultural Workers (in million)

3.29

4.95

0.35

NSS

Rice Procured (in 000 tonnes)

1936.69

1354.22

0.67

Food Corporation of India

Wheat Procured (in 000 tonnes)

1774.91

894.78

0.59

Food Corporation of India

Rice Productivity

2.84

2.01

0.03

DES, GOI

Wheat Productivity

2.71

1.93

0.34

DES, GOI

Own Tax Revenue per capita

2655.51

2815.21

0.86

Basu, Barenberg and Soylu
(2017)

Age

35.03

34.96

0.97

NSS

Household Size

4.764

5.17

0.28

NSS

Hindu

0.605

0.74

0.03

NSS

Muslim

0.17

0.06

0.01

NSS

Scheduled Caste

0.19

0.16

0.52

NSS

Scheduled Tribe

0.03

0.093

0.04

NSS

Other Backward Castes

0.57

0.57

0.99

NSS

Number of States

7

11

Districts

92

58

Observations

226,062

150,844

Note: This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in this paper. Columns (1) and (2) present the mean values
of variables for states that did not enact market-oriented reforms and those who enacted reforms respectively. Column (3)
presents the p-values of the student’s t-test of equality of means in columns (1) and (2) and column (4) provides the data
source used for each variable. Annual Farm incomes per cultivators and daily agricultural wage is deflated by the Consumer
Price Index for rural labor to calculate real annual farm incomes in 2004-05 prices. DES refers to the Directorate of Economics
and Statistics of the Government of India and NSS refers to the Employment and Unemployment Rounds of the National
Sample Survey data.
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Table 3: Procurement of Wheat and Rice by the FCI as a Proportion of Total Production in a State
Reform Status

1999-2000

2004-2005

2007-2008

2009-2010

2011-2012

Rice

Wheat

Total

Rice

Wheat

Total

Rice

Wheat

Total

Rice

Wheat

Total

Rice

Wheat

Total

Control

0.16

0.11

0.14

0.20

0.13

0.16

0.24

0.15

0.17

0.19

0.12

0.15

0.17

0.19

0.17

Treatment
2004

0.31

0.07

0.17

0.49

0.08

0.29

0.49

0.33

0.40

0.48

0.28

0.37

0.52

0.51

0.51

Treatment
2005

0.29

0.00

0.29

0.21

0.00

0.21

0.32

0.00

0.32

0.30

0.00

0.30

0.28

0.00

0.28

treatment
2006

0.12

0.08

0.11

0.15

0.09

0.14

0.14

0.12

0.17

0.14

0.09

0.15

0.17

0.16

0.20

Treatment
2007

0.00

0.05

0.05

0.00

0.01

0.01

0.00

0.06

0.06

0.00

0.02

0.02

0.00

0.09

0.09

Note: This table presents trends in FCI procurement of cereals (rice and wheat) as a proportion of total production of these crops for states that
implemented market-oriented reforms and those that did not adopt these reforms. Data on procurement is taken from the Food Corporation of
India web portal and data on total agricultural production comes from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of India.
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Table 4: Parallel Trends: Real Average Annual (Ln) Farm Incomes
(1)
Treat x Post

0.175
(0.129)

Observations
R-squared
State FE
Year FE
Controls
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

46
0.834
YES
YES
YES

Table 5: Testing the Parallel Trends: Daily Real (Ln) Agricultural Wages
(1)
DD
Reform x Year x Procurement

0.295
(0.184)
-0.661***
(0.239)
65,696
0.753
YES
YES
YES

65,696
0.753
YES
YES
YES

-0.0524
(0.114)

Procurement x Year
Procurement
Reform

Observations
R-squared
District FE
Year-Quarter FE
District Specific Linear Time Trend
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

DDD
-0.774
(0.803)
2.761
(1.825)
0.616
(0.690)
0.128
(0.429)
-0.592
(1.186)
-3.416**
(1.654)

Procurement x Reform
Reform x Year

(2)
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Table 6: Impact of Marketing Reforms on Annual (ln) Real Farm Incomes
(1)
(2)
(3)

DD
Marketing
Reform

DD
Marketing
Reform

DD
Marketing
Reform

Reform x Post

0.0264
(0.118)

0.0214
(0.0962)

0.0241
(0.120)

Observations
R-squared
State FE
Year FE
Macro Controls
Agriculture Controls
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

119
0.887
YES
YES
NO
NO

119
0.908
YES
YES
YES
NO

89
0.939
YES
YES
YES
YES

Table 7: Impact of Marketing Reforms on Daily (ln) Real Agricultural wages
(1)
(2)
DD
DD

(3)
DD

Reform x Post

0.0311
(0.0546)

-0.0352
(0.0570)

-0.000595
(0.0672)

Observations
R-squared
District FE
Year Quarter FE
Controls
District Specific Linear Time Trend
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

30,315
0.805
YES
YES
NO
NO

30,315
0.821
YES
YES
YES
YES

30,315
0.829
YES
YES
YES
YES
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Table 8: Impact of Reforms and Public Procurement on Annual Real (ln) Farm Incomes
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Reform x Post x Procurement
Reform x Post
Post x Procurement
Reform x Procurement

Observations
R-squared
State FE
Year FE
Macro Controls
Agriculture Controls
State Specific Linear Time Trend
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.522**
(0.181)
-0.0939
(0.168)
-0.227***
(0.0606)
-0.0145
(0.198)

0.413**
(0.161)
-0.0813
(0.133)
-0.148*
(0.0746)
0.0265
(0.187)

0.472**
(0.194)
-0.186
(0.154)
-0.156*
(0.0845)
-0.0555
(0.180)

0.394**
(0.169)
0.0187
(0.198)
-0.211**
(0.0775)
-0.193
(0.139)

89
0.932
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO

89
0.941
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO

89
0.946
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO

89
0.983
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Table 9: Impact of Reforms and Public Procurement on Daily Real (ln) Agricultural
Wages
(1)
(2)
(3)
DDD
DDD
DDD
Reform x Post x Procurement
Reform x Post
Post x Procurement
Reform x Procurement

Observations
R-squared
State FE
Year-Quarter FE
Controls
District Specific Linear Time Trend
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.301**
(0.125)
0.140*
(0.0809)
-0.520***
(0.129)
0.180***
(0.0595)

0.402**
(0.157)
-0.106
(0.0949)
-0.281*
(0.152)
-0.0405
(0.0948)

0.528**
(0.223)
-0.264**
(0.108)
-0.201
(0.188)
-0.145
(0.0925)

30,315
0.806
YES
YES
NO
NO

30,315
0.821
YES
YES
YES
NO

30,315
0.829
YES
YES
YES
YES

39

Table 10: Impact of Reforms and Public Procurement of Rice on Daily Real (ln)
Agricultural Wages
(1)
(2)
(3)
DDD
DDD
DDD
Reform x Post x Procurement
Reform x Post
Post x Procurement
Reform x Procurement

Observations
R-squared
District FE
Year-Quarter FE
Controls
District Specific Linear Time Trend
Robust
standard
errors
in
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.793***
(0.150)
-0.0156
(0.0688)
-0.660***
(0.171)
-0.272***
(0.0933)

0.638***
(0.160)
-0.0952
(0.0628)
-0.625***
(0.180)
-0.452***
(0.0833)

0.667***
(0.221)
-0.0942
(0.0797)
-0.584***
(0.216)
-0.314***
(0.0800)

30,315
0.807
YES
YES
NO
NO

30,315
0.823
YES
YES
YES
NO

30,315
0.829
YES
YES
YES
YES
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Table 11: Impact of Reforms and Public Procurement of Wheat on Daily Real
(ln) Agricultural Wages
(1)
(2)
(3)
DDD
DDD
DDD
Reform x Post x Procurement
Reform x Post
Post x Procurement
Reform x Procurement

Observations
R-squared
District FE
Year-Quarter FE
Controls
District Specific Linear Time Trend
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

-0.460**
(0.186)
0.0664
(0.0556)
0.167
(0.140)
0.482***
(0.0955)

0.138
(0.268)
-0.0953
(0.0587)
-0.297
(0.227)
0.394***
(0.0942)

-0.216
(0.351)
-0.115
(0.0776)
0.0312
(0.225)
0.363**
(0.139)

30,315
0.808
YES
YES
NO
NO

30,315
0.823
YES
YES
YES
NO

30,315
0.830
YES
YES
YES
YES
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Appendix A: Robustness Checks
I.

Difference-in-difference by year

This section presents several alternative specifications to test the validity of our results. First, we show
the difference-in-differences coefficient for each year-quarter between 2000 - 2012. We interact the
dummy for market reforms with year-quarter dummies to estimate impact of market reforms on real
agricultural wages. The results for the complete specification of equation (2) are presented in Figure A1.
We can see from Figure A1 that the difference-in-difference coefficient for agricultural wages after
market-oriented reforms was initially negative and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence
interval. As the interval from the reforms increases, the coefficient becomes insignificant. Further, Figure
A1 also shows that in the pre-reform period, the difference-in-differences coefficient is not significantly
different from zero which confirms the parallel trend assumption necessary for the difference-indifferences estimation.

Figure A1: Difference-in-differences by year

II.

Difference-in-differences with Chand Reforms

As discussed in Section 3.1.c, our reform variable constructed by the authors by reviewing state-level farm
laws. Our classification of reform status is comparable to existing research including Purohit et al., (2016)
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and Chand and Singh (2016) for all states except Assam and Odisha. We test the impact of market-oriented
reforms on farm incomes and agricultural wages using the reform index constructed by Chand and Singh
(2016). To test whether our results are driven by the inclusion of Assam and Odisha, we assign a treatment
dummy to states that scored above 50 on the composite index are Chand and Singh and zero otherwise
and re-estimate equations (1) and (2). The results are shown in Table A1. In column (1) we show the results
of equation (2) and column (2) shows the results of the difference-in-differences specification using the
reform index of Chand and Singh (2016). Similar to the results of the difference-in-differences of Tables 4
and 6, we find that marketing reforms have no impact on real farm incomes.

Table A1: DD with Chand and Singh (2016) data
Parallel Trends
(1)
Chand Reform x Trend

-0.0746
(0.665)

Chand Reform x Post

Observations
R-squared
District FE
Year Quarter FE
Controls
State Specific Linear Time Trend

(Ln) Real Farm
Incomes
DD
(2)

0.0277
(0.148)
47
0.921
YES
YES
YES
YES

89
0.939
YES
YES
YES
YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A2 below shows the results for the difference-in-differences specifications for real agricultural
wages. Similar to the main results in Table 5 and 7, we find that market reforms did not have any significant
impact on agricultural wages.
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Table A2: Ln Agricultural Wages with Chand and Singh (2016) data
Parallel
Trends

(1)
Chand Reform x Trend

(Ln)
Real
Farm
Incomes
DD
(2)

0.121
(0.266)

Chand Reform x Post

0.0434
(0.0952)

Observations

17,406

17,406

R-squared
District FE

0.719
YES

0.719
YES

Year Quarter FE
Controls

YES
YES

YES
YES

District Specific Linear Time Trend

YES

YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

III.

Placebo Treatment

Next, we test the validity of our difference-in-differences estimates by designing placebo treatment using
the pre-reform period (1994 – 2000). Using data from 2000 as the post period, we re-estimate the
difference-in-differences equations (1) and (2). The results for real farm incomes are presented in Table
A3 and those for real agricultural wages are presented in Table A4. In both cases, we include all controls,
two-way fixed effects, and region-specific linear time trends. We find that in both cases, there is no impact
of the reforms on real farm incomes.
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Table A3: Placebo Treatment Real Farm Incomes
(1)
Market Reforms

(2)
Chand and Singh
(2016)
Reform
Index

Reform x Post

0.0602
(0.29)

-0.816
(0.86)

Observations
R-squared
State FE
Year FE
Controls
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

35
0.92
YES
YES
YES

35
0.981
YES
YES
YES

A4: Placebo Treatment Real Agricultural Wages
(1)

(2)
Chand and Singh
(2016) Reform Index

VARIABLES

Market Reforms

Reform x Post

0.0417
(0.102)

0.0695
(0.103)

Observations
29,982
R-squared
0.094
District FE
YES
Year-Quarter FE
YES
Individual Controls
YES
District Specific Linear Time
YES
Trend
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

29,982
0.095
YES
YES
YES

Reform x Post

YES
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IV.

Addressing small number of clusters

One of the major concerns with our estimate is the low number of clusters. Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller
(2008) show how studies with a small number of clusters tends to underestimate standard errors which
leads to over-rejection of the null. Since we have only 18 states, the number of clusters in our sample is
small and this may bias our estimates. To address this concern, we correct our difference-in-differences
and triple difference estimates by bootstrapping our standard errors according to the procedure
described in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008). Table A5 shows the bootstrapped standard errors for
our main estimates for our state-level regressions for real farm incomes. We find that our results remain
significant.
V.

Dropping states that enacted reforms in a given year
Since we study real farm incomes and agricultural wages over the period 2000 – 2012, we test whether
our triple difference estimates of Tables 8 and 9 are driven by the inclusion of some specific states. To test
whether our results are robust to the exclusion of states that enacted reforms in a given year, we reestimate the triple difference specification of equations (4) and (5) by excluding states that enacted
reforms in a given year.
The results for real farm incomes are shown in Table A5 and for real agricultural wages are shown in Table
A6. In both cases we find that our results are not driven by the inclusion of states that enacted reforms in
a given year.

VI.

Dropping states from the sample

Next, we test whether our triple difference estimates of Tables 8 and 9 are driven by the inclusion of some
specific states. To test whether our results are robust to the exclusion of states, we re-estimate the triple
difference specification of equations (4) and (5) by excluding one state at a time.
The results for real farm incomes are shown in Table A7 and for real agricultural wages are shown in Table
A8. In both cases we find that our results are not driven by the inclusion of states that enacted reforms in
a given year.
VII.

Decomposition Analysis – keeping states that only procured wheat and only procured rice

Finally, we test the robustness of the decomposition of our triple difference results presented in Tables
10 and 11 by excluding states that witnessed both wheat and rice procurement. The results are shown in
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Table A9. We find that our results are not driven by the inclusion of states like Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, and
Haryana which benefit from both wheat and rice procurement.

A5: Bootstrapped Standard Errors
(1)

(2)

Market Reforms

DDD

0 .274**

Reform x Post x Procurement
Reform x Post

(0.129)
-0.1416
(0.096)

0.097
(0.0971)

Observations
29,982
R-squared
0.094
State FE
YES
Year FE
YES
Controls
YES
Bootstrapped Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

89
0.946
YES
YES
YES

Table A6: Robustness Check: Triple Difference Estimation Real Farm Incomes
Dropping states that adopted reforms in
2004
2005
2006
2007
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Reform x Post x Procurement

0.432**
(0.203)

0.496*
(0.249)

0.836***
(0.180)

0.504**
(0.185)

Observations
R-squared
State FE
Year FE
Controls
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

84
0.943
YES
YES
YES

79
0.948
YES
YES
YES

59
0.960
YES
YES
YES

79
0.955
YES
YES
YES
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Table A7: Robustness Check: Triple Difference Estimation Real Agricultural Wages
Dropping states that adopted reforms in
2004
2005
2006
2007
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Reform x Post x Procurement

-0.341
(0.289)

0.947***
(0.268)

-1.074
(1.589)

0.190
(0.225)

Observations
R-squared
District FE
Year-Quarter FE
Controls
District Specific Linear Time Trend
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

28,098
0.824
YES
YES
YES
YES

27,276
0.833
YES
YES
YES
YES

19,460
0.822
YES
YES
YES
YES

29,193
0.830
YES
YES
YES
YEs
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Table A8: Robustness Check Triple Difference Estimation Real Farm Incomes
Dropping the Following states

Andhra
Pradesh

Assam

Bihar
United

Gujarat

Haryana

Himachal
Pradesh

Jammu &
Karnataka
Kashmir

Kerala

Madhya
Pradesh
United

Maharashtra Odisha

Punjab

Rajasthan

Tamil
Nadu

Tripura

Uttar
Pradesh
United

West
Bengal

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

Reform x Post x
Procurement 0.480**

0.463* 0.509** 0.522*** 0.485** 0.485*

(8)

(12)

0.327* 0.401** 0.431* 0.432** 0.583*** 0.419* 0.463** 0.577*** 0.334* 0.462** 0.461** 0.487**

(0.182) (0.219) (0.204)

(0.173)

(0.197) (0.265)

(0.164) (0.187)

(0.226) (0.203) (0.185)

(0.232) (0.204)

(0.186)

(0.190) (0.201) (0.186) (0.196)

Observations

84

84

84

84

84

84

84

84

84

84

84

84

84

84

85

84

84

R-squared

0.947

0.946

0.945

0.956

0.945

0.947

0.954

0.951

0.946

0.943

0.952

0.945 0.938

0.950

0.952

0.944

0.947

0.945

State FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Year FE

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Macro Controls YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Agriculture
Controls

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

84

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A9: Robustness Check Triple Difference Estimation Real Agricultural Wages
Dropping the Following states
Andhra
Pradesh

Bihar United

Gujarat

Haryana

Himachal
Pradesh

Jammu
&
Kashmir

Madhya
Pradesh
United

DDD

0.526**
(0.204)

0.851***
(0.193)

0.740***
(0.201)

0.534**
(0.207)

0.471**
(0.207)

0.115
(0.196)

Observations
R-squared
District FE
Year-Quarter
FE
Controls
District
Specific
Linear Time
Trend

27,636
0.820
YES

25,798
0.813
YES

29,945
0.817
YES

30,017
0.819
YES

29,955
0.817
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Tripura

Uttar
Pradesh
United

West
Bengal

0.00682
(0.192)

0.798***
(0.197)

0.581***
(0.209)

0.345*
(0.198)

29,193
0.819
YES

26,031
0.839
YES

30,009
0.818
YES

29,109
0.812
YES

24,096
0.793
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Odisha

Punjab

Rajasthan

0.00198
(0.193)

0.779**
(0.304)

0.802***
(0.236)

0.484**
(0.206)

30,115
0.818
YES

28,098
0.813
YES

24,645
0.816
YES

29,448
0.820
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Tamil
Nadu

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A10: Keeping States that had only Rice and Wheat Procurement
(1)
(2)
VARIABLES
DDD Rice DDD Wheat
Reform x Post x Procurement

1.553***
(0.588)

-0.194
(0.130)

Observations
R-squared
Distrcit FE
Year-Quarter FE
Controls
District Specific Linear Time Trend
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

30,315
0.824
YES
YES
YES
YES

30,315
0.829
YES
YES
YES
YES
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Appendix 2: Variable Construction
Value Added
We construct a consistent time series of state-level value added in agriculture at current prices in two
steps.
First, we extract data on value added in agriculture from Table 6, Components of Net State Domestic
Product at Factor Cost by Industry of Origin (at current prices) from the 2004-05 Handbook of Statistics
on Indian Economy (available on the website of the Reserve Bank of India).12 This table gives two value
added series, an old series with base year 1980-81 and a new series with base year 1993-94. The unit of
measurement is rupees crore. We take the 1980-81 base year series data for the years 1980-81 to 199394; we take the 1993-94 base year series data for years 1993-94 to 2004-05. For each year we compute
the growth factor of value added in agriculture as the ratio of value added in a year and value added in
the previous year. Thus, we get an annual growth factor series (for value added in agriculture) that runs
from 1980-81 to 2004-05.
Second, we extract data on value added in agriculture from Table 6, Components of Net State Domestic
Product at Factor Cost by Industry of Origin (at current prices), from the 2012-13 Handbook of Statistics
on Indian Economy (available on the website of the Reserve Bank of India). This table gives value added
series with base year 2004-05 in rupees billion. Data are provided for the years from 2004-05 to 2012-13
for most states; for some states, data is available till 2011-12. For these latter states, we take the figure
for 2012-13 from Table 6 in the 2013-14 Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy. The unit of
measurement of this data is rupees billion. So, we multiply it by 100 to express it in crores of rupees.
Our value-added series for agriculture uses the figures with base 2004-05 for the years 2004-05 to 201213, and then we project the series backward from 2003-04 to 1980-81 using the growth factor series that
we calculated in the first step. This gives us a consistent state-level value-added series for agriculture at
current prices at an annual frequency running from 1980-81 to 2012-13.
Total Wage Bill
We construct a state-level series for the total wage bill in agriculture using unit level data from the
Employment and Unemployment Survey (EUS) conducted the NSSO for the 43rd round (1987-88), the
50th round (1992-93), the 55th (1999-00), the 61st round (2004-05), the 64th round (2007-08), the 66th
round (2009-10) and the 68th round (2011-12). The total wage bill in a state is defined, for any EUS year,
as the sum of total wages earned by agricultural laborers in a year.13 Data on average daily wage rate for
12

The reader should note that we focus on agriculture and not the agriculture and allied activities sector. The
latter includes three sub-sectors: agriculture, forestry & logging, and fishing. Thus, we do not add the value added
coming from forestry, and logging & fishing.
13

Using the weekly employment status of workers reported in the EUS Rounds of the NSS, we calculated the
weekly agricultural wage bill by multiplying the average weekly wage for agricultural workers with the total
number of agricultural workers. This weekly wage bill is then multiplied by 52 (number of weeks in a year) to
calculate the total wage bill in a year.

52

agricultural workers, average number of days worked per week by agricultural workers and total number
of agricultural workers is extracted from the EUS.14

Real Farm Income per Cultivator
We compute the state-level farm income as the difference between value added in agriculture and the
total wage bill. To convert nominal farm income into real, or inflation-adjusted, farm income, we divide
the nominal magnitude by the state-level consumer price index for rural labourers (CPIRL, published by
the Labour Bureau of India). We divide this by the total number of cultivators to get real farm income per
cultivator, where data on the total number of cultivators is extracted from the EUS.15

14

In the EUS unit level data, a person is identified as an agricultural worker if she worked as a regular or casual
employee in agriculture. For instance, in the 68th round of EUS, her “status” code was 31, or 51, and her “industry”
code was 01.
15

In the EUS unit level data, a person is identified as a cultivator if she worked in a household enterprise (selfemployed) in agriculture. For instance, in the 68th round of EUS, her “status” code was 11, 12 or 21, and her
“industry” code was 01.
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